In November 2013, Ukrainians were flocking to Kyiv's central Independence Square , the Maidan Nezalezhnosti , in protest at President Viktor Yanukovych's refusal to sign a new Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU). Even though the demonstrations were primarily about internal Ukrainian issues, the demonstrators' dissatisfaction with their government erupted around the question of Ukraine's ties to the EU. In the months following the outbreak of the protest, Ukraine has substantially transformed. In July 2014, it was a different country than it was in November 2013, having de facto lost Crimea to Russia and facing substantial internal tensions as well as the breakaway provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the meantime, the AAs with the EU were signed by the new Ukrainian government of Petro Poroshenko.
The EU has played both a central and a marginal role in these transformations. It was central in the sense that the AA was widely seen as the initial trigger for the protests -and thus the subsequent turmoil. Soon after the protests began, numerous EU flags appeared on the square and the term Euromaidan emerged, suggesting that the protests were tied to the demand for a pro-European orientation of Ukraine. In particular in the Western media, the disputes were often reduced to a struggle about Ukraine's East or West orientation, with the BBC even referring to the Ukraine as an 'EU-Russia battleground' (BBC 2013 ; see also Spiegel 2013; Guardian 2014).
At the same time, the EU was marginal in the sense that its influence over the clashes and transformation processes remained limited. Key EU agents were remarkably silent during this phase. Instead, intergovernmentality in the form of the 20-year-old Weimar Triangle was briefly revived, leading to a temporary compromise negotiated with Yanukovych by the French, German and Polish foreign ministers in February 2014.
In the subsequent events that led to the ousting of Yanukovych and the referenda in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine, collective EU foreign policy was also largely absent.
In light of the EU's ambition to play a key role in its immediate neighbourhood and its substantial external relations toolbox, this absence of collective foreign policy was remarkable. When the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in December 2009, it foresaw a foreign minister for the Union -a foreign minister who could not be called as such but who instead received the title of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). The position was filled by the largely unknown and diplomatically inexperienced British Labour politician Catherine Ashton (Howorth 2011). The Treaty also foresaw the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a diplomatic service in assistance of the HR/VP to fulfil his/her mandate (Art 13a, Lisbon Treaty, see EC 2007f). Equipped with a political mandate from the European Council, the service further institutionalised the collective conduct of foreign policy beyond the established coordination mechanism of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It provided the institutional foundation for collective diplomacy in the form of an autonomous body entitled to speak on behalf of the EU (i.e. including the member states), not just the European Commission (Carta 2012).
Yet the provision of such an institutional foundation does not automatically translate into collective diplomatic agency in practice. The EEAS, and Ashton in particular, had a difficult start (Howorth 2011; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013) . In particular in the beginning, member states were reluctant to cede some of their authority on foreign policy and diplomacy -traditionally considered strongly statebased policy fields and 'bastions' of national sovereignty. Carta (2012, 3) observes that 'the EU possesses a foreign policy insofar as its members agree upon it'. For the situation in Ukraine described above, the positions of EU member states were not fundamentally opposed, yet as regards the EU's common positioning towards Russia, the traditional differences between old and new EU member states (Kuus 2014) strongly resurfaced. Moreover, in addition to the difficulty of finding common ground between the different EU institutions and member states on specific issues of foreign policy, the acceptance of EU agency amongst its external 'partners' cannot be taken as a given. Despite the EU's attempts to establish itself as a more influential global actor, its real influence on the international stage also depends on a range of factors that are not necessarily under the control of EU institutions.
